

Michael Welker
John Witte
Stephen Pickard
(Eds.)



THE IMPACT of RELIGION

on Character Formation, Ethical Education,
and the Communication of Values
in Late Modern Pluralistic Societies



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understand why some found a certain closeness between Buber's view on this ideal methodology and the postmodernism prevalent today.⁶¹ Despite this seeming affinity between them, especially in light of Buber's giving pride of place in research to the scientist's personal world, there nevertheless is a considerable, significant difference between them.

As regards Buber—not only did he not participate in the current deconstruction of the metanarrative of the belief in God, but his view that enables the various narratives of every researcher to be expressed in his or her scientific work ensues *specifically from the metanarrative* of belief in God to which he fully subscribed. For Buber, this metanarrative represented the "Absolute" that, he argued, reflects the objectivity of the truth. This already shows the vast distance between Buber and the relativistic postmodern worldview.

This God, from whom Buber identifies in his life experience the possibility of hearing the voice of the Absolute, does not demand that human beings set aside or totally abandon the unique core of their existence when they set out to explore the objects in the world (as Weber requires). All that is asked is this: that a person set aside *personal inclination* during this activity in the world (not only in the field of research, but in all activity of any sort). Nevertheless, from the moment that the researcher's personal inclination has been removed, and no longer "conceals" the object, then the investigation of the object becomes (in the methodology of loving science) attentiveness to the Thou. That is, deep attentiveness to what emerges from the object of research that comes to light following the profound attentiveness that the researcher devotes to it. Thus, it is transformed from an object, at the beginning of this path, to a subject, at its conclusion—to a subject that speaks to the researcher in its unique voice, received in the researcher's ear as the singular existence that whispers its secret. The product, as in art, is the researcher's masterpiece.

As we have seen, unlike Weber's position, and unlike what is accepted in academic research (at present, as in Buber's time), from Buber's perspective the researcher must commit to studying the objects of research with a Thou relation, which will enable a loving attitude to the object of research, and with sincere devotion and attentiveness to what is taught by the material placed before the researcher in the basic approach that Buber calls loving science. In this manner, the researcher learns: "In the features of the beloved, whose self he [the loving person] realizes, he discerns the enigmatic countenance of the universe."⁶²

⁶¹ See above, note 3.

⁶² Buber, "With a Monist," 29.

Elements of Religious Socialization in Islamic Cultures

How to Be a "Good" Muslim in Europe?

Raja Sakrani

Introduction

Can we ignore that today seven billion humans address Him [God] every day, feel His emotional closeness, fear His judgment and make appointments in magnificent places of prayer which we call churches, mosques, synagogues, and various temples? Could we not try to understand why this fundamental need so often drifts towards a totalitarian language that petrifies souls and, in the name of the loved one, sometimes turns into hatred of the Other?

—Boris Cyrulnik¹

Religions are necessary to socialize souls. While Boris Cyrulnik is fully engaged as a neuropsychiatrist in analyzing and exploring the best subject of the attachment theory—God—as illuminated in the introductory quotation, Ronald Dworkin demonstrates in *Religion Without God* that religion is deeper than God. A belief in a god is only one possible manifestation or consequence of a deeper worldview. Religious socialization gives meaning to human presence in the world: it provides benchmarks, a kind of grid for understanding why human life should have a purpose, and the universe order and values. Religion must then be understood in a very broad sociological sense, while its conceptual framework must also take account of nonbelievers. As the first influence on children's lives, the family transmits beliefs, values, and practices not only (and probably not primarily) through its explicit religious views and expectations but also through its own actions and guidelines. Thus, the family offers children the chance to build habits and to assume them as self-evident. It is this type of heritage that has characterized the cross-generational reproduction of religious affiliations and related practices as "sociological."²

¹ My own translation: Boris Cyrulnik, *Psychothérapie de Dieu* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2017), 8 f.

² More generally on what is socially constructed, see John Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (London: Penguin Press, 1995).

Since the time of Émile Durkheim, Niklas Luhmann, Max Weber, and the other founders of sociology,³ there has been general consensus to consider religious socialization acts as an indispensable avenue for transmitting values to future generations.⁴

When it comes to the religious socialization of youth, we most often think of parents and peers. Studies repeatedly find parents to be the most important religious influence in the lives of youth. . . . And there is considerable research identifying the impact of peers on religious commitments. . . . Social institutions are also important . . . and [compare to] the importance of educational institutions and religious organizations for influencing religious commitments.⁵

However, it must be noted from the start that in Islamic cultures, such transmission has involved extremely complex and diverse coded processes. Indeed—and due to intertwined legal-religious, political, social, and moral spheres, which are also variable according to “Islams” or Islam in the plural⁶—religious socialization is the vector of normative orders par excellence. It is the fundamental place for moral and communal socialization, either in parallel to or independent of religious transmission. Moreover, the specificity of Islam is discernable in two regards. First, and strictly in institutional terms, there is no clergy in Islam. In other words, the personnel and mechanisms ensuring religious socialization and transmission are not subject to any institutionalized ecclesiastical framework. Second, an enormous gap exists between an enlightened Muslim elite—a significant part of which lives in Europe or North America—and a huge mass of frightened, worried, manipulable believers, who are “lost.”⁷

³ Cf. Werner Gephart, *Gründer Väter. Soziologische Bilder* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich 1998).

⁴ For an overview on religious socialization, see Lisa D. Pearce, “Religion and Youth: Agents of Religious Socialization and Youth,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015); Vassilis Saroglou, “Personality and Religion: Personality Influences on Religiousness,” in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed., 2015.

⁵ Pearce, “Religion and Youth.”

⁶ Raja Sakrani and Werner Gephart, “‘Recht’ und ‘Geltungskultur’. Zur Präsenz islamischen Rechts in Deutschland und Frankreich,” in *Rechtsanalyse als Kulturforschung* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2012), 103–37.

⁷ This immense problem goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Reference is only made to previous work on the imbrication of normative orders in some Muslim societies, especially after decolonization, as well as to the question of the Muslim Other in Europe and its medieval roots. Cf. Raja Sakrani, “Des orders normatifs fragmentés à l’hybridité juridique: le cas du Maghreb colonial,” in *Rechtsanalyse als Kulturforschung*, 231–65; cf. id.,

How, then, do Muslim communities in Europe experience religious socialization? How do they manage Islam’s normative universe and the pressure of socialization through the image of family, neighbors, community, and religious leaders on one hand, and the creation of their own practices according to a plural globalized culture on the other? Beyond these questions, how can we identify the specificity of Islam as compared to other religions, especially in regard to belonging. Stated otherwise: how does one become a member of an Islamic (religious) community?

In examining this question, this chapter claims in no way to cover all the modes and processes of Islamic religious socialization, nor does it decode all immediate, distant, and shifting consequences both within Islamic cultures and in increasingly pluralistic European societies. Instead, it attempts to outline the mechanisms of religious socialization of Muslims in Europe in order to better understand the contours of the Islamic narrative identity in its three dimensions: personal, socioreligious, and cultural. In his new book *Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle of Recognition*, Francis Fukuyama revisits the concept of European nationalism and its counterparts in non-European colonized cultures as well as the emergence of identity problem in a pluralist Europe. In fact, modern Islamism “needed to be seen through a similar lens of modernization and identity.”⁸

Both nationalism and Islamism are rooted in modernization. The shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* has been occurring in the contemporary Middle East, as peasants or Bedouin have left the countryside for cities such as Cairo, Amman, and Algiers. Alternatively, millions of Muslims experienced modernization by migrating to Europe or other Western countries in search of better lives, settling in Marseille or Rotterdam or Bradford and confronting there alien culture. . . . The identity problem is particularly acute for young second-generation Muslims growing up in immigrant communities in Western Europe. They are living in largely secular societies with Christian roots that do not provide public support for their religious values or practices. . . . Like many children of immigrants, they are eager to distance themselves from their families’ old-fashioned ways of life. But they are not easily integrated into their new European surroundings: rates of youth unemployment, particularly for Muslims, are upward of 30 percent, and in many European countries a link is still perceived between ethnicity and membership in the dominant cultural community. . . . Under these circumstances, confusion about identity becomes acute, just as it was for newly urban-

⁸ “The Law of the Other: An Unknown Islamic Chapter in the Legal History of Europe,” *Rechtsgeschichte* 22 (2014): 90–118.

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition* (London: Profile Books, 2018).

ized Europeans in the nineteenth century. For some Muslims today, the answer to this confusion has not been membership in a nation, but membership in a larger religious group—an *umma*, or community of believers.⁹

How to become a “good” Muslim in Europe is, therefore, at the heart of the facets and difficulties of religious socialization outlined in this modest essay.

Religious Socialization: Some General Considerations

If an individual wants to differentiate himself or herself by creating a “me and the others”¹⁰ narrative, he or she is also motivated by identifying the group that shares the same values, religion, and culture, thereby creating a larger perception

⁹ Ibid., 67 f.

¹⁰ The differentiation between oneself and others inevitably raises the question of Otherness in the European context. What about Islamic pasts in Europe? Is it a question of historiography or of Otherness? Cf. Sakrani, “The Law of the Other” (note 7), 91: “There is no doubt that historiography has to be selective for methodological reasons. That is one of Weber’s legacies to legal history. But the direction of selectivity is steered, according to Weber, by interests and values. To this extent, the question is about the *Kulturbedeutung* of a nearly complete denial of an important part of European history. The category of the Other—in the philosophical sense—carries within it the self-deployment of thought. This goes beyond Hegel’s perception, who regarded the Other as the motor of any dialectics. It is true, however, that within European culture, the Other has long been under the influence of a universal developed from the unique experience of Europe. Today, questioning history, and legal history in particular, is not only an urgent task, but also one legitimated by the rarity of legal research when compared to anthropological studies that seek to move the world’s center of gravity away from its Western focus. To imagine a cultural and legal Other is first and foremost to free the diversity of cultures from its dependence on European culture. However, such an act constitutes both a problem and a challenge for research into the history of law—in particular—as leaving Eurocentrism.” On Otherness and its relationship to the problem of the European identity from a philosophical, psychological and historical point of view, by way of indication see Jörn Rüsen, *Das Andere denken. Herausforderungen der modernen Kulturwissenschaften* (Ulm: Humboldt-Studienzentrum der Universität, 2000); cf. Tzvetan Todorov, *La conquête de l’Amérique. La question de l’autre* (Paris: Seuil, 1982); cf. id., *Nous et les autres. La réflexion française sur la diversité humaine* (Paris: Seuil, 1989); cf. Julia Kristeva, *Étrangers à nous-mêmes* (Paris: Fayard, 1988); cf. Emmanuel Levinas, *Altérité et transcendance* (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1995); id., *Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité* (Paris: Livre de poche, 1990); cf. Pierre Ouellet, ed., *Le soi et l’autre. L’énunciation de l’identité dans les contextes interculturels* (Québec: Les presses de l’Université Laval, 2002); cf. Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

of “us and them.” However, while socialization involves a societal constraint on the subject, it also plays a key role in appropriating and subjectively interpreting the pressures of socialization. Even though the margin of individual choice is strongly at stake, it varies considerably with each religion. However, the specific focus here is the Islamic religion. We will revisit this facet of socialization later. In any case, the process of intergenerational religious transmission involves several players of socialization, including mainly the family, places of worship, religious schools, and peers.

In traditional societies, initiation rituals (circumcision, physical and psychological hardships, excision, dancing, etc.) mark children’s and adolescents’ entry into the adult world.¹¹ In modern societies, however, transmission has become profoundly different in nature since the mode of communication and the speed of change have heralded in a cultural imperative that causes what religious sociologists call a transmission crisis.¹² In pluralistic global societies, this crisis corresponds to the global modification of collective references, ruptures of memory, and reconsideration of values that question the very foundations of social cohesion and religious precepts. Thus, all religious socialization institutions (family, school, places of worship, associations, etc.) are confronted with this cultural discontinuity that forces them to define their mission. It remains to be seen whether the dynamics of this shifting transmission have also reached the transmitting actors of Islamic religion.

It is clear, however, that each religion activates collective memory through a universe of symbols, practices, and rituals.¹³ In addition, one or more significant founding events give a collective meaning to religious transmission, such as the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus for Christianity, the promise made to the chosen people for Judaism, the Quran and Muhammad’s path for Islam, the enlightenment of the Buddha for Buddhism, and so on. Thus, rituals such as baptism or communion for Christians, as well as the *brit milah* (circumcision), Bar

¹¹ For the scientific breakthrough of my concept of “rites de passage,” cf. Arnold van Gennep, *Les rites de passage* (Paris: Librairie Stock, 1924); cf. also: Victor W. Turner, *Le phénomène rituel: structure et contre-structure. Le rituel et le symbole: une clé pour comprendre la structure sociale et les phénomènes sociaux* (Paris: PUF, 1990); cf. id., *The Anthropology of Performance* (New York: PAJ Publications, 1986).

¹² Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *La religion en miettes ou la question des sectes* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2001); cf. id., *Le Pèlerin et le Converti. La religion en mouvement* (Paris: Flammarion, 1999).

¹³ Here by following the concept of religion as developed by Émile Durkheim; see *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Carol Cosman (London: Oxford World’s Classics, 2008).

mitzvah,¹⁴ and Shabbat for Jews, are essential to religious transmission. In Islam, apart from circumcision for boys, no obligatory rituals mark the entrance of girls and boys into the Islamic community. This "ritual poverty", however, accompanies a state of norms that determine what is allowed and forbidden in Islam. Skipping Ramadan, for example, does not mean that the subject is expelled from the Islamic community, but, as will be illustrated later,¹⁵ this type of religious socialization plays a complex role, especially among young people and even Muslim children in Europe. Another decisive point of comparison is the future of religion in European societies. As these are subject to rapid change and innovation, opportunities arise for individuals to promote their own choices and conceptions of life and the world—often noncompliant with and thus detrimental to a transmitted religious legacy. One could say that the case of Islam is often reversed compared to the model described. The process of liberation also produces a certain destruction of the collective memory. This question intersects with the relationship of religion, society, and memory. Instead of a common reference to a shared socioreligious bond, religious socialization appears more as a kind of individual do-it-yourself project¹⁶—like feeling Christian while simultaneously deserting churches, or embarking on spiritual searches through the Internet, readings, or identification with non-European spiritualities.

Although this modest chapter is not dedicated to comparing processes of socialization among different religions, it should be stressed that the subjective form of individual religiosity¹⁷ breaks—or at least hinders—forms of communalization and thus religious transmission. At the same time, this trend must be tempered insofar as this model does not determine the whole landscape of Christian religious socialization. In fact, it provokes an opposite mechanism of community gathering. As paradoxical as it may seem, individuals, despite their subjective tendency to their religion, also tend to validate their beliefs and values with the group that shares them.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the particularity of this model is that it

¹⁴ This ceremony, which takes place in a synagogue, marks the religious majority among Jews, which is thirteen years for men and twelve years for women. The young believer affirms that he or she accepts God's commandments and becomes a full member of the Jewish community, as young Christians do during confirmation.

¹⁵ See below.

¹⁶ This image of religion on the grocery market, where you put some sacred ingredients together—as some sociologists of religion have formulated for the Western world—does not apply to the Islamic case.

¹⁷ The measurement of religiosity is a different task; see as a classical study in the field of religion Ursula Boos-Nünning, *Dimensionen der Religiosität. Zur Operationalisierung und Messung religiöser Einstellungen* (München/Mainz: Kaiser/Grünwald, 1972).

¹⁸ Cf., e.g., Danièle Hervieu-Léger, "La transmission des Identités religieuses," *Identités* (2016): 154–69.

always reserves a considerable place for individual experiences to be exchanged and shared with other members of the group. This phenomenon, in turn, means that the confirmation of normative validity that churches and clerics provided for centuries has now gone elsewhere. The evangelists in England and the charismatic Catholic movements in France vividly illustrate this socioreligious normative displacement. In such instances, shared beliefs and worldviews can even prompt different group actions. Besides proselytizers such as Jehovah's Witnesses or Mormons, other religious groups prefer to rely on a community life outside the world, as is the case with followers of Krishna. But what about Islam?

Could it be said—given the absence of clergy in Islam and despite the major but sometimes problematic role of imams in Europe—that the tension between institutions and community processes constitutes a new source of a religious validity culture? Could we also say that the specificity here is that institutional staff (imams, muftis, community leaders, etc.) can play an active role at both institutional and community levels? While the answer to these questions must still be found, it is certain that this tension can lead to a split in the group of believers.¹⁹ Those who think they alone hold the absolute and pure truth do not need institutional legitimacy anymore and start producing their own system of validity, which is best exemplified by the rise of fundamentalist groups over the past decades. This system is problematic, threatening Western values and norms, as its desire to impose a model of authentic religious socialization must distance itself from anything that could taint its purity, such as an Islam that is too "soft" or "tolerant."

Depending on the country and sociopolitical context, Islamic religious socialization in Europe allows for the cohabitation of the two models to varying degrees. Furthermore, the question about the real role of *fiqhu al-aqalliyāt*, minority jurisprudence,²⁰ is more than legitimate, since it involves complex legal conse-

¹⁹ Classically analyzed by Max Weber as the tension between "virtuosi" and "laymen." Cf. "Sociology of Religion," in id., *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 453–565.

²⁰ For the first time, Muslim communities constituted a minority outside the *dar al-islam* (House of Islam). What's more, this phenomenon is quite interesting from a normative perspective. This is demonstrated by new legal literature that started appearing from the 1990s on—in both Arabic and English. In the United States, it was pioneered notably by Mohamed Jabir al-Alwani, and elsewhere by Cheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi and many others. The literature is addressed to the Muslim minorities in the *dar al harb* (House of War). The Arabic name for this legal doctrine is *fiqh al-aqalliyat* (minority jurisprudence). I shall not further elaborate on this very complex legal phenomenon. Suffice it to say that it is still under development and will one day certainly form a part of the legal history in Europe. Cf. R. Sakrani, "Religion als Legitimation einer Geltungskultur? Islamische Rechtskulturen in Europa im Wandel," in *Religions-Politik 1. Zur historischen Semantik euro-*

quences regarding both the national judicial system and what is called "parallel justice" in Europe. Being developed in the United States and the Middle East, minority jurisprudence addresses, as an abundant legal literature since the 1990 s, Muslim minorities especially in Europe and North America.

The Muslim is an active actor within his or her individual culture. At the same time, the solidity among the community plays a major role not only in framing each individual, but especially in coding and fixing the group's identity and religious boundaries. Several forms of religious socialization will illustrate this dynamic: religious socialization of children, Ramadan, circumcision, religious education, and prisons.

Specificity of Islamic Religious Socialization

The religious claim of Islamic communities in Europe has grown significantly since the 1980 s. This growth has raised intense debates and unleashed passionate opinions, particularly in France when discussing whether veils could be worn at school.²¹ Let us remember in passing that France is home to the two largest Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe.

päischer Legitimationsdiskurse, ed. Georg Pfeleiderer and Alexander Heit (Zürich: Nomos, 2013), 406 f.

- ²¹ France is passionate about what one could call "the phenomenon of the veil." At I write this essay, a new case broke out in France, provoking a social debate and even the intervention of the president of the Republic. The French Parliament wants to legislate again about the veil. Veiled mothers picking up their children from school risk being denied this right because they are veiled, even when they are outside educational institutions. The literature on this problem is immense; see, concerning France and only as example: *Droit & Société: Le voile en process. L'affaire du voile: regards croisés*, Paris, Vol. 68 (2008); Sakrani and Gephart, "'Recht' und 'Geltungskultur'" (note 6), 123–26; Thomas Deltombe, *L'islam imaginaire. La construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en France, 1975–2005* (Paris: Le Découverte, 2007), esp. 98–121 and 337–59. In the European context, see Bianca Brünig, "The Influence of Religious Socialization and Partnership Characteristics on the Religious Practice of Veiling," ISH-Arbeitspapier des Instituts für Soziologie der Leibniz Universität Hannover, Jan. 2015, 1–19; Cees Maris, "Laïcité in Low Countries? On Headscarves in a Neutral State," New York University School of Law, European Union Jean Monnet Chair, 2007; Hugues Dumont and Xavier Delgrange, "Le principe de pluralism face à la question du voile islamique en Belgique," *Droit & Société* (note 21), 75–108; Schirin Amir-Moazami, "Production discursive et fabrication juridique: Le foulard de l'enseignante en Allemagne," in *Ibid.*, 109–126; Maheila Malik, "Complex Equality: Muslim Women and the 'Headscarf (UK)," *Ibid.*, 127–52.

Beyond both the movement of "judicialization"²² of Islamic normative orders in the wide sense²³ and the application of sharia by European judges or special councils,²⁴ there has been a growing interest of the humanities (and more recently legal studies) in what is felt and claimed by large Islamic communities in Europe in regard to the threat of identity loss. The inevitable question is, of course, whether this threat is due to what many researchers formulate in terms of confrontation, or even culture clashes,²⁵ or due to the fact that Islamic religious and cultural references are devalued or conflict with relations of domination and integration in host societies. Religious socialization would then play a specific role for millions of Muslim migrants and refugees, regarding the affirmation of oneself. Because of their dual enculturation, children and adolescents, for example, try—through religious socialization—to mobilize complex identity strategies that reflect their plural identities in European societies. In addition, several studies²⁶ have shown that the affirmation of oneself through Islam could be a response to social injustice and racism (unemployment, exclusion, stigmatization, etc.). Finally, it must be noted that the phenomenon of conversion²⁷—increasingly widespread in Europe

²² Compare with the concept of "juridisme" used by Jacques Commaille in his book *À quoi nous sert le droit* (Paris: Callimard, 2015), 41 f.

²³ The case of Lille concerning the annulment of marriage of a Muslim couple on the grounds that the bride was not a virgin and applying Article 180 § 2 of the French Civil Code is a prime example. See analysis and criticism in Sakrani and Gephart, "'Recht' und 'Geltungskultur'" (note 6), 118–21.

²⁴ Cf. Sigrid Nökel and Levent Tezcan, eds, *Islam and the New Europe: Continuities, Changes, Confrontations* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2005); Mathias Rohe, "The Formation of a European Shari'a," in *Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre*, ed. Jamal Malik (Münster: Lit, 2004), 161–84; Heiner Bielefeldt, "Political Secularism and European Islam: A Challenge to Muslims and Non-Muslims," in Malik, *Muslims in Europe*, 147–60; Katja Jansen Fredriksen, "Sharia in Norwegian Courtrooms?," *Society & the State* 20 (2007): 44–45.

²⁵ Beyond the questionable concept used by Samuel P. Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Penguin, 2014), see Maurits Berger, "Islam in Europe: A Clash of Tolerances," in *Radicalization in Broader Perspective* (The Hague: NCTb/Clingendael, 2007), 1–7, at https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20070500_cdsp_art_berger.pdf.

²⁶ See among other studies: Thorsten Gerald Schneiders and Lamya Kaddor, eds., *Muslims in Rechtsstaat* (Münster: Lit, 2005). On the relationship of young Muslims to both religion and violence, see "Modalités et spécificités de la socialization des jeunes musulmans de France," *Revue française de sociologie* 52 (2011): 311–52.

²⁷ "Narrative of Conversion to Islam in Britain: Female Perspectives" was produced by the Centre of Islamic Studies (CIS) at the University of Cambridge in association with the New Muslims Project of Markfield in London. The conclusions are based on a series of forums and examines the experiences of nearly fifty British women who have converted to Islam: <https://theconversation.com/converting-to-islam-not-for-the-faint-hearted-re>

and often leading to religious radicalization or even violent militancy—questions not only the change of religion itself and its reasons, but above all the emotional and ideological potential of a particular conception of Islam that invites new converts. Indeed, those who convert often speak of “revelation,” “new light,” or “a huge journey,” a “rebirth.”²⁸ The conversion generally accompanies changing community dynamics and therefore a new worldview: new values, rituals, and practices. This change implies a new conceptualization of the world and an upheaval of the convert’s social universe. It is a narrative reconstruction of a followed path.

Islamic identity and the religious sociability particularly of young people in the context of European acculturation is a very vast field, difficult to grasp in terms of empirical quantitative research, not to mention the political²⁹ or epistemological considerations that add more complications.³⁰ The definition of Islamic identity evokes a particular difficulty, that of reduction of belonging to Islam as a monolithic block. But in fact, there are “a thousand and one ways”³¹ to establish a relation to it.

Transmission of Religion to the New Muslim Generations: Reinvented Culture?

Etymology is revealing. Among the Moroccan and Algerian diasporas in particular, there is an expression for host countries: *blād an-nasārā*, which literally means “land of Christians.” At its core, this expression refers to two relationships of domination: that of the colonial period, and that of host societies. The intensification of the religious concern evident in the latter case actually characterizes the former. We should not forget that Morocco, for example, given its proximity to Spain, ceased to experience conquests and counterconquests between North Af-

port-says-14382. For a general understanding of women’s conversion in France, see Virginia Riva, *Converties* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2015).

²⁸ Corinne Rostaing, Céline Béraud, and Claire de Galember, “Religion, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation in French Prisons,” *Archives ouvertes* (2018): 16.

²⁹ The wide-ranging debate on Islam and Islamism is more pronounced in the intellectual and media world in Europe, particularly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989—and especially after the fall of the World Trade Center in New York in 2001.

³⁰ The concept of acculturation, for example, gives rise to variable criticisms, mainly socio-demographic and psychological: integration, insertion, assimilation, cohabitation, and marginalization.

³¹ An expression used by François Burgat in his writings.

rica and Europe from the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula³² until French colonization in the nineteenth century. Beyond cult functions, religious socialization is a source of identification that has a mobilizing effect on Muslim migrants, especially in their relationship with the rest of society. Viewed from an ideological perspective, moreover, religious socialization allows the safeguarding of social order shaken by a host society or by global society. In other words, it activates preservation or defense. For many parents, religious socialization also serves as an intense control mechanism over their child’s behavior—which they believe will protect specific cultural markers and solidify a sense of ethnocultural belonging. Thus, performing circumcision, celebrating Ramadan, forbidding the consumption of certain food and drink, prohibiting specific clothing, and barring entry to places such as bars and nightclubs are instrumental acts developing of one’s self. Girls are often more affected by these limitations, which in turn influence their reaction to such socialization.³³

Nevertheless, this observation must be nuanced and adapted to the Islamic diaspora in *each* European country. Some studies examining Maghreb communities in France and Belgium, for example, have shown that this more or less intense use of religious socialization regarding children plays a dual role, since it relates the originating society with the welcoming society. It is important to note that young people inherit the conditions, experiences, and traumata of their parents. Religious identity³⁴ appears crucial during confrontational or rivalrous situations with the welcome society. Young people live their parents’ heritage as a kind of adversity. Certainly, the colonial past of the colonizer and colonized plays a major role, as decades of silence and amnesia cannot be erased from the collective memory of migrants. Besides, one should differentiate between religious practice and belief. The parents’ ritual practices or religious knowledge is not automatically transmitted to children. There may even be religious ignorance that can easily be retrieved through a web of radicalization or other sources. In general, only male circumcision, followed by the consumption of halal products, particularly in relation to avoiding pork, are largely accepted, if not approved, by young people. The relationship between young people and religious practices like Ramadan, abstaining from alcoholic drinks, participating in prayer, and so on is

³² For an overview on minorities’ status in Muslim Spain, especially the legal status of *ghimmī* (Christians and Jews), see Raja Sakrani, “The *Qhimmi* as the Other of Multiple *Convivencias* in al-Andalus: Protection, Tolerance, and Domination in Islamic Law,” *Rechtsgeschichte* 26 (2018): 95–138.

³³ See below.

³⁴ The fundamental relationship of “Religion und Identität” is discussed in Werner Gephart and Hans Waldenfels, eds., *Religion und Identität. Im Horizont des Pluralismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).

flexible according to the context. It is important in this regard to insist on a major turning point in the religious socialization of young people.

On levels of argumentation and the legitimization of practices, young people distinguish themselves from their parents. Thus, and alongside the classic argument of cultural motivation and cultural identity under the family guise, the search to rationalize practices or seek an extrareligious argument attracts attention: Ramadan is practiced because fasting is good for one's health; circumcision is performed because it is hygienic. A very revealing psychosocial phenomenon is that of imaginary or postponed practice.³⁵ Prayer, for example, is likely to be a late-adopted, time-delayed practice among young people. This results in a kind of mimicry, or parent-child cycle, since the parents were in turn in their youth semipracticing or nonpracticing Muslims. Studies in France, in particular, have shown that the degree of practice among Muslims increases significantly with age. A French study on the practice of Ramadan by Muslim children has shown that they are embedded both in horizontal socialization processes (parents, families) and peer-to-peer socialization processes, that is, interchild exchanges. It is intriguing, for example, to see the strategies that children develop in the canteens of schools, when their parents and school regulations forbid them to fast during Ramadan. Schools' imperative (attending classes, eating in the canteen, participating in sports activities, etc.) takes the lead instead of the religious one. However, children adhere to the hierarchy in their own way, sometimes competing with one another to prove who is able to hold out the most and not "break" Ramadan. When the supervisors go to the canteen to see if the children eat, Muslim schoolchildren—girls and boys—pretend to eat, then spit out what was in their mouth to respect Ramadan. This parallelism of behavior, this self-reflexive attitude, of which fasting is the vector, serves as a marker of social distinction in inter-child socialization: it gives the child a certain superiority!³⁶

The main question therefore is the following: if Muslim identity³⁷ often references ethnic or ideological criteria and is considered a simple refuge, are young Muslims able to fulfill their desire to reconstitute their religious culture by going beyond the ethnic-segmentary relationship of Islam? Does this allow for a more universal socialization that is capable of reactivating this religion's rich spiritual reserve? No one can answer this question since the process is ongoing; no one can predict what the result will be.

³⁵ Cf. Guy Michelat and Michel Simon, *Classe, religion et comportement politique* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1977).

³⁶ Elza Zotian, "Expériences enfantines de rites et fêtes religieuses," *ethnographiques.org*, N. 25 (2012), 1–26.

³⁷ Cf. Jamal Malik, "Muslimische Identitäten zwischen Tradition und Moderne," in Gephart and Waldenfels, *Religion und Identität* (note 34), 206–29.

Reinvented Islamic Spiritual Culture?

Taking a critical look at the question of Islamic religious socialization leads us to an intriguing paradox: in European societies, Islam is represented or imagined as a monolithic, irrational, and rigid religion and set of laws. It is therefore hypermediatized and perceived as an archaic identity refuge for millions of migrants and refugees. However, this monotheistic religion itself, let alone its spiritual values, civilizations, and their place in universal heritage, is rarely studied. In several European societies—and this is a fact—the use of Islam as an identity refuge or the "Islamization" of many young people (especially in difficult neighborhoods and suburbs frequently marginalized and involved in petty and organized crime) marks a kind of subscription by default, or a forward flight from identity. However, focusing on Islam only as an ideology blinds us from other essential perspectives. Following Max Weber, Islamic *jihād* (not in the sense of war but in the sense of effort on oneself) becomes the task of surpassing oneself. Thus, practicing even the most demanding rituals, such as rigorous prayer and fasting, is an ascetical and certainly spiritual effort. At the same time, it is also "rationalized" to fight against the temptations of what Weber refers to as *orgiastische Trunkenheit* (orgiastic intoxication)³⁸ This crossroad in young people's lives is delicate and decisive: either conform to an excess of ignorant, rigid, and meaningless ritualization with the risk of societal rejection or even radicalization, or attempt to cultivate a habitus of salvation and social (re)integration. Complementing or combining Emile Durkheim with Weber, worship is not just an act of faith; it is the medium for inner peace, both with oneself and with others.³⁹ Faced with worrying spiritual poetry during prayer in mosques, for example, many young and old followers seek alternative paths to find less complementary forms of religious socialization. It should not be forgotten that European countries confront the problem of imams who come from other Muslim countries to varying degrees. Because they are socialized in a different environment, or within the framework of a mass radicalization project,⁴⁰ they are not able to assume an educational or leadership role.

³⁸ Max Weber, *Economie et Société* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1971), 550.

³⁹ On the Durkheimien concept of "effervescence" in comparison with the concept of "acte d'institution" by Pierre Bourdieu, see W. Gephart, "Rituale der Ritualbeobachtung. Von Émile Durkheim 'effervescence' über Marcel Mauss' 'fait total' zu Pierre Bourdieus 'acte d'institution,'" in *Diskussionsbeiträge des SFB 619 "Ritualdynamik" der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg*, Nr. 6, ed. Dietrich Harth and Axel Michaels, 2004, 1–27, at <https://journals.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/ritualdynamik/article/view/347>.

⁴⁰ See for example the very pertinent analysis by Nicolas BEAU and Jacques-Marie BOURGET in their book *Le vilain petit Qatar. Cet ami qui nous veut du mal* (Paris: Fayard, 2013), denouncing—in the case of France—those responsible within French politics who, to escape the financial crisis, demand aid for a country that fosters a radical Islam, finances

Parallel to the construction of mosques, autonomous spaces are also created to offer alternative forms of religious and cultural socialization (associations, discussion rooms, interreligious dialogues, or recreational spaces, etc.). Is this a "culturalization" phenomenon of traditional religious socialization? Is this a more secular trend to deal with spiritual and cultural issues of the Islamic religion in a freer framework that often lacks in the homeland but is offered in Europe? While the scope of this chapter does not allow these immense questions to be answered fully, helpful elements can be identified. The gender dimension, for example, plays an important role. Despite the female's presence in this new kind of socialization, women are more attracted to education and continue to have a critical reaction to socialization in general. Indeed, girls who are more discriminated against and subjected to stricter family control since their early childhood,⁴¹ particularly with regard to freedom and sexual relations, are more oriented to education and academic success. Girls look for socialization elsewhere. Here, it is important to note that cultural belonging, combined with Islamic religious socialization, is often seen as problematic—as if migratory communities and their descendants had to choose between two incompatible cultures, the Islamic and the Western; as if the mixture and hybridity⁴² of two or more cultures is not reconcilable. Having said that, there is a clear desire among young Muslims to go beyond a vision of Islam based on ethnicity and identity and assume a dual culture: Islamic-European.

the satellite TV channel Al-Jazeera, and propagates hatred and radicalization throughout the world, a country that has snuffed out the embers of the Arab Spring to avoid a greater revolution, and, worst of all, offers billions to France to purchase the football club Paris Saint-Germain, invest in French real estate, acquire capital in companies, and finance, above all, plans to rescue the *banlieues* (suburbs). If the production of radicals (read terrorists) is part of the rescue plan, the mission has been quite successful. And with all this, France is no isolated case in Europe. Saudi Arabia plays a similar role in the region and globally. See in the same sense the excellent sociopolitical analysis by Mohamed-Ali ADRAOUI, *Du golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé*, with insightful introduction by Gilles Kepel (Paris: PUF, 2013).

⁴¹ A recent book published in Germany points out this discrepancy between girls and boys as well as the dominant male culture in many Muslim families: Ahmet Toprak, *Muslimisch Männlich Desintegriert. Was bei der Erziehung muslimischer Jungen schief läuft* (Berlin: Econ, 2019).

⁴² Elisabeth Bronfen, Benjamin Marius, and Theresa Steffen, eds., *Hybride Kulturen. Beiträge zur anglo-amerikanischen Multikulturalismusdebatte* (Tübingen: Staufenburg Verlag, 1997).

Muslim Education and Religious Schools

The children of migrants and refugees—boys and girls alike—can often obtain European nationality. They have all been affected by the migratory disruption on their family history and communities, sometimes violent and traumatic.⁴³ They have been caught up in various periods by a great upheaval of Islam as a religion and as a civilization, with major historical events, often shortened and misunderstood, being particularly impactful: the Iranian Revolution and the oil crisis of 1979; the veil issue in France in 1989; the Gulf Wars in 1991 and 1994; terrorist attacks by Al-Qaida on September 11; violence by the Islamic State in Paris, Brussels, the United Kingdom, and Berlin; the relentless Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the emergence of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and the unbelievable crimes committed against "bad" Muslims, religious minorities in the Middle East, and even the human cultural heritage "from Mosul to Palmyra."⁴⁴

A major issue at the crossroads of socialization and transmission strongly marked "generational consciousness"⁴⁵ at the turn of the millennium. In the 1980 s, there was a remarkable trend—albeit, different depending on the context of each country—of the emancipation of migrant status. The Beur March (march of the French Arabs) in France is a notable example. In the 1990 s, identity building was based on religious distinction (massive return of the veil, more religious practices and rituals, etc.). More recently, the fight has taken another turn: that of Islamic sociopolitical integration into European citizenship. Let us recall the flagship statement by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, in 2008: "[A] form of Sharia Law [is] inevitable in the UK."⁴⁶ Or the statement by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in the midst of an influx of Syrian refugees in 2015,

⁴³ The Algerian case is emblematic of French colonial history. This traumatic effect for post-colonial generations, children and grandchildren of migrants, is increasingly addressed through various artistic forms including literature. See, for example, the writings of Alice Zeniter, *L'art de perdre* (Paris: Flammarion, 2017); Jean-Luc Einaudi, *La bataille de Paris. Le 17 octobre 1961* (Paris: Seuil, 1991). See also the interdisciplinary approach in Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire, eds., *La fracture coloniale. La société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial* (Paris: La Découverte, 2006).

⁴⁴ It is also partly the title ("Cités millénaires—Voyage virtuel: De Palmyre à Mossoul") of an impressive exhibition produced by l'Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris (October 2018–February 2019) which later travelled to Bonn, Germany, at the Bundeskunsthalle (von Mossul nach Palmyra) from August to November 2019.

⁴⁵ Studies on this issue vary across disciplines and perspectives. One of the pioneers is Karl Mannheim, "Das Problem der Generationen," *Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie* 7 (1928): 157–85, 309–30.

⁴⁶ Ben Russel and Colin Brown, "Archbishop of Canterbury Warns Sharia Law in Britain Is Inevitable," *The Independent*, February 8, 2008.

that "Islam is a part of Germany" (*Der Islam gehört zu Deutschland*),⁴⁷ which was followed by a comment from Horst Seehofer, the leader of the Christian Social Union, in 2018 stating that "Islam is not a part of Germany."⁴⁸

From a sociological point of view, methodological and epistemological critiques are necessary. Legal and social science research on Islamic religious socialization and age does not have extensive investigational resources compared to those dedicated to the study of European values over forty-plus years. Consequently, some sociological studies are conducted using "cohort reasoning, a concept based on an objective criterion, which makes it possible to combine individual and historical time, personal biography, and social dynamics."⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the problem is that not all cohorts necessarily transform into generations in the manner discussed. Stated more clearly, young Muslims are placed in socioreligious discontinuity due to the aforementioned traumatic events. Attitudes of rebellion and cultural innovation fall within a process of protest that challenges the identity and normative construction of which they are the object. However, generational consciousness requires more than rebellion or contestation. It is a question of at least two capacities: the conception and knowledge of identitarian belonging, and the production of reflective knowledge about the self and the other. The greatest difficulty lies in this hinge. How are young people—both as objects and social actors of religious socialization—capable not only of falling within religious transmission, but also reinventing it and therefore, reinventing a new normative order?

Thus, if religious transmission places young people in a collective "us" (which goes beyond the ethnic-religious connotations of the *umma* concept), they in turn reintegrate themselves into a pluralism of paths. Indeed, the family primarily ensures the transmission. Parents transmit the norms of beliefs and main practices like prayer, fasting, and the two main festivals in Islam, namely the end of Ramadan (*Eid al-Fitr*) and the feast of sacrifice.⁵⁰ The family also forges the personality and identity of children through the transmission of moral norms such as sexual prohibitions, food restrictions, gender relations, and so on. Other standards corroborate the transmission since it also depends on community belonging: an In-

⁴⁷ "Der frühere Bundespräsident Wulff hat gesagt, der Islam gehört zu Deutschland. Das ist so. Dieser Meinung bin ich auch." Andreas Rinke, *Das Merkel-Lexikon: Die Kanzlerin von A-Z* (Lüneberg: zu Klampen, 2016), 191.

⁴⁸ "Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland." Bruno Heidelberger, *Wohin geht unsere offene Gesellschaft? 1968–Sein Erbe und seine Feinde* (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2019), 289.

⁴⁹ Point discussed, for example, in C. Saint-Blancat, "La transmission de l'islam auprès des nouvelles générations de la diaspora," *Social Compass* 51/2 (2004): 237.

⁵⁰ Note that Islam is the only one of the three monotheistic religions that still celebrates the feast of the sacrifice of sheep, and that this celebration is linked to logistical and cultural complications in several countries in Europe.

dian Islam is not transmitted in the same way as a Turkish, Maghreb, or African Islam, let alone an Islam in the country of residence. In the end, this differentiation draws the group's boundary.

Certainly, the fact that transmission does not take place in a structured and institutional framework—because Quranic schools or mosques do not necessarily take the place of families or attract all parents or young people—gives young people's itinerary a varied or very individualized or unstable character. In this regard, Islamic schools and the integration of Islamic religious education in public schools in several European countries play a very significant role in the socialization of young people.⁵¹ Simultaneously, the access to Islamic culture and law⁵² not only for Muslims but also for non-Muslim Europeans allows a better mutual knowledge. In his excellent comparative study on the identity of young French and German Muslims, Nikola Tietze⁵³ rightly highlights the diversity of backgrounds and combines each individual biography with the cultural, emotional, communal, and ethical depths of religious affiliation.

A fairly new dynamic is happening in Europe. It is a process of redefinition, reframing, negotiation, reflection, and more interesting innovation.⁵⁴ A major intellectual and academic project is underway in Europe: the first female imams are there,⁵⁵ as are the institutes and universities of innovative Islamic theologies,⁵⁶ as

⁵¹ Abdulkader Tayob, Inga Nychaus, and Wolfram Weisse, eds., *Muslim Schools and Education in Europe and South Africa* (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2011). See therein especially Michael Kiefer and Irka-Christin Mohr, "The Pros and Cons of Islamic Religious Education in German Schools," 163–72.

⁵² For the German context, legal empirical studies are crucial for understanding the evolution of Islamic law and its application, even in an extrajudicial frame. See for example, the recent study by Mahmoud Jaraba, "The Practice of *Khul'* in Germany: Pragmatism versus Conservatism," *Islamic Law and Society* 26 (2019): 83–110. *Khul'* is divorce initiated by the woman. See also Adel Theodor Khoury, Peter Heine, and Janbernd Pebecke, eds., *Handbuch Recht und Kultur des Islams in der Deutschen Gesellschaft. Probleme in Alltag–Hintergründe Antworten* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2000); Hilmar Kruger, "The Study of Islamic Law in Germany: A Review of Recent Books on Islamic Law," *Journal of Law and Religion* 15 (2000–01): 303–30.

⁵³ Cf. Nikola Tietze, *Jeunes musulmans de France et d'Allemagne: Les constructions subjectives de l'identité* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002).

⁵⁴ This question covers an enormous field: families, schools, government, alternative spaces, private and public spaces, citizenship and rights, law and judicial apparatus. For further deepening, see Mark Sedgwick, ed., *Making European Muslims: Religious Socialization among Young Muslims in Scandinavia and Western Europe*, Routledge Studies in Religion (London: Routledge, 2015).

⁵⁵ The North American context shows significant differences from that of Europe. Indeed, feminist personalities such as Amina Wadud, for example, have been able to break into a very hermetic universe reserved for men—the imamat of prayer and the interpretation of

well as critiques of authoritarian Islam, gender hierarchy, and “cellars’ Islam” (*l’islam des caves*).⁵⁷ The training of the young Muslim elite significantly shifts the debate on Islamic socialization and transmission. In addition, the active participation of women in this process has in turn triggered a major debate on the reappropriation of theological-legal knowledge by Muslim women, which is increasingly being used as a precursor to change. Women are often demanding the right to choose their studies and future husbands, and to play their own role in theological-legal work of the historicity of the Quran, or at least its interpretation. In the same vein, the ambiguous and multifunctional use of the veil acts as a symbol

the Koran. One should remember that Wadud’s research specialties include gender and Qur’anic studies. On Friday, March 18, 2005, she acted as imam for a congregation of about sixty women and forty men seated together with no gender separation, thus breaking with Islamic laws, which allow only male imams to be prayer leaders. Female imams include Kahina Bahloul, Eva Janadin, and Anne-Sophie Monsinay. In recent years, the French Islamic community has been trying to catch up with its neighbors; a backwardness that, according to Ghaleb Bencheikh, president of the Fondation de l’Islam de France, is due to the “global atmosphere polluted by violence and terrorism.” In Germany, England, and Denmark, women who lead prayer in mosques are no longer the exception. On September 7, 2019, they organized a prayer: the first one led by women in France. The assembly was mixed, and some women did not wear a veil, as did the two imams, Janadin and Monsinay, who led the prayer in Arabic and French in a room rented for the occasion in Paris, which for Ludovic-Mohamed Zahed, a homosexual imam, marks the continuity of a “great movement.” The purpose of this project is to offer “spaces for dialogue free of any community and family pressure.” According to Janadin and Monsinay, “there is a silent minority, perhaps not so much of a minority as that, of progressive Muslims, who no longer attend traditional mosques and find themselves practicing alone, and who are waiting for this project”: <https://www.journaldesfemmes.fr/societe/combats-de-femmes/2561874-islam-femmes-imam-france-priere/>.

⁵⁶ For the Nordic countries and Germany, these institutions are beginning to train a new generation of researchers in this field. Other European countries are still far from this new academic process. In the Arab-Muslim world ravaged by wars, the failure of postrevolutionary transitional justice, and disastrous socioeconomic conditions, the process of separation between Islamic theology on one hand and secular law on the other still struggles to take place in the academic landscape.

⁵⁷ See the long report by Hakim El Karoui (more than six hundred pages—Institut Montaigne) to the French President Emmanuel Macron in September 2018: *La fabrique de l’islamisme*, especially part 3, “Comment l’islamisme se diffuse: des homes, des organization, des medias,” 265–316. See also the book by Gilles Keppel *Les banlieues de l’islam. Naissance d’une religion en France* (Paris: Seuil, 1991).

for the search of oneself and freedom. The latter aspect is not always as normative as stigmatization wants it to be, a sign of submission and domination by men.⁵⁸

Paradoxically, this type of protest reappropriates religious transmission to question or even transgress it; becoming a female imam and not wearing the veil testifies to this. As does the feminine transmission of normative and religious knowledge, particularly in Northern Europe and Germany.⁵⁹ As does the hermeneutical and social work on the question of common values and citizenship rather than on the identity discourses of the Islamic *umma* within Europe. Stated differently, this is a European and noncommunity religious socialization. Facing the ever-real danger of orthodox and radical recovery of young people by preachers or transnational organizations, the academic structure of legal and theological studies is an emergency response.⁶⁰

Circumcision

Circumcision is one of the most famous surgical procedures and can already be identified in Egyptian wall paintings dating back to 2300 BCE. In Judaism, baby

⁵⁸ About this discussion, see Étienne Balibar, et al., *Le foulard islamique en questions* (Amsterdam: Editions Amsterdam, 2004); Régis Debry, *Ce que nous voile le voile. La République et le sacré* (Paris: Gallimard, 2004); Ismahane Chouder, Malika Latrèche, and Pierre Tevanian, eds., *Les filles voiles parlent* (Paris: La Fabrique Edition, 2008).

⁵⁹ One could think of female scholars (Muslims and non-Muslims) such as Angelika Neuwirth in Germany and her researches on the Koran—for instance, *Der Koran als Text der Spätantike. Ein europäische Zugang* (Berlin: Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2010). At the level of female academics and imams at the same time, the list is getting longer in Europe. To name but a few: Seyran Ates, the Berlin lawyer of Turkish origin, lives under police protection and has had to interrupt her activities since she defended victims of so-called honor crimes. She studied Islamic theology and became the first female imam in Germany (June 16, 2017). All currents of Islam—Sunni, Shii, Alevi, but also homosexuals and transsexuals—are welcome in this progressive mosque, which intentionally bears the name of the German poet Goethe and the twelfth-century Arab Andalusian doctor and philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes). The American-Malaysian Ani Zonneveld is also one of the few female imams in the world. Sherin Khankan is the first imam of Denmark; a sociologist and psychologist by training, she is the founder of the Mariam Mosque in Copenhagen (February 2016), the first mosque reserved for women.

⁶⁰ Significant differences exist among European countries. In the Nordic countries and Germany, there is a first generation of “Muslim elite” who train the next generations in institutes and universities of Islamic theologies and law. Great Britain is unique with sharia councils and imams, some of whom are beginning to combine theological knowledge with legal academic training to enable them to deal with normative heritage in a reflective and critical way. France and other countries are still far from this process.

boys are circumcised on the eighth day after birth. This operation is justified in the Torah by the covenant between Abraham and God (Genesis 17:10). Muslims are the largest religious group to practice circumcision, also called *tahāra* to indicate purification. Unlike Judaism, Islam does not establish an age for circumcision. Rather, it is done sometime between birth and puberty. Apart from religious reasons,⁶¹ circumcision is also practiced for reasons of belonging⁶² or as a rite of passage. In his famous book *Les rites de Passage*,⁶³ Arnold van Gennep describes various initiation rites in many circumcision rituals in Africa. They comprise three phases: the separation of children or adolescents from the rest of society, a phase of transformation (circumcision as well as sometimes extreme psychological and physical tests), and finally the reintegration into the group in a new social role—a role that can now be assumed, as the man is no longer a boy or “contaminated by a female element: the foreskin of the penis.”

Circumcision is also widespread in Europe and the United States for different reasons. In the 1980 s, studies in the United States showed that mothers of circumcised babies cited hygiene as a first reason. The United Kingdom has known this tradition since the nineteenth century, and circumcision was rather practiced in high society. On a strictly legal level, it is necessary to know that there is a difference between the schools of Sunni Islam in classical Islamic law. *Shāfi* and *Hanbalī* schools consider circumcision compulsory, while the *Hanafī* school argues that it is no more than a recommendation. Lastly, the *Mālikī* school tends to recommend it unequivocally.

Despite these differences and despite *fatāwā* in Egypt (especially in the twentieth century), where circumcision is not considered compulsory,⁶⁴ circumcision is practiced almost 100 percent in Islamic communities. Basically, it is a Muslim practice and not a legal-religious norm of Islam. Above all, it serves to mark belonging to the group. Circumcision is seen as a religious ritual and as a normative and symbolic transmission mechanism—this is also true for Judaism.⁶⁵ What is then at stake is the collective memory, described by Maurice Halbwachs as “this current of thought, a continuity which has nothing artificial, since it retains from

⁶¹ One should remember that the Copts in Egypt and Orthodox Christians of Ethiopia practice circumcision, but other churches prohibit it worldwide.

⁶² This is the case for the Aztecs and Mayans in Latin America, the Australian Aborigines, and several Pacific islands, such as Polynesia, Fiji, and Indonesia.

⁶³ Van Gennep, *Le rites de passage* (s. note 11).

⁶⁴ *Fatāwā* of 1951 and 1958. Moussa Abou Ramadan, “Les débats sur la circoncision en droit musulman classique et contemporain,” in *La circoncision rituelle* (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2015), 25–38.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., “Die Beschneidungsdebatte—eine religionsrechtliche und religionspädagogische Herausforderung,” *Theo-Web. Zeitschrift für Religionspädagogik* (2014), book 1, 1–75.

the past only what is still alive or capable of living in the consciousness of the group that holds it.”⁶⁶ The rite is characterized in particular by the transmission function. Circumcision carries an affinity between religion and culture. It is a kind of identity marker written into the human body.⁶⁷ Circumcision is also the transmission of the paternal body and a diversion from or removal of the fear of loss. Symbolism therefore takes precedence over legalism from the legal-social dimension (debate on the sexual mutilation of children in light of criminal law, etc.). Thus, circumcision is doubly identity-based: it is both masculine (having the same *genitalia* as one’s father and friends at school, for example) and religious. In Judaism, another issue is equally important: the imposition of paternal memory through the transmission of the masculine, thereby competing with maternal filiation (the standard of traditional Jewish law).

Conversion and the Problem of Prisons

The Islamic religion in European prisons has become a structuring norm on several levels. In all prisons, religion plays a variable role, depending on the context of each country and religious socialization. Prisoners generally use religion as a means of resistance or as an avenue to find meaning and seek new forms of socialization. Obviously, the relationship with religion varies according to the crimes committed, the severity of the sentence, the profile of the prisoner, and so on. These aspects prompt another investigation in its own right. In the context of this chapter, it is important to determine how the Islamic religion, as a normative reference, can be situated within prisons.

If religion in general can play multiple roles with individual religiosity, as well as in regard to connecting with family, for example, or other prisoners, Islam is unique in that its normative load and its great capacity of inclusion sometimes intervene in a problematic manner, especially when identity is shaken or narcissistic normative references appear. From this point on, a comprehensive and functionalist approach no longer applies. Instead, a radical shift in meaning—a rebirth of the individual and a radical change in his or her relation to the world—dominates. This last characteristic is particularly present among new Islamic converts in European prisons.

Religion could anchor another starting point that goes through the intensification of religious practice, lived in its ethical dimension. The Islamist prisoner declares his willingness to get by. Religion is part of a desire for another life. The

⁶⁶ Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire—la mémoire collective* (Paris: PUF, 1950).

⁶⁷ Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, “*Les rites comme actes d’institution*,” in *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 1982.

ritual practice of prison prayer thus becomes therapeutic. Two testimonies illustrate the psychological effect.

In the case of Nicolas, a Frenchman, the conversion to Islam came during his fourth incarceration. His testimony highlights the normative charge and adherence to rules that Islam offers: "It has changed a lot for me! My way of seeing life, my way of seeing my neighbor, . . . we are here for a purpose. There are rules to follow."⁶⁸

The second witness is a Muslim who faces a heavy sentence, during which he "rediscovered" Islam in prison. The relationship to the Islamic transcendence of the priest has in his case had a "therapeutic," anxiolytic effect that has been facilitated through prayer: "It is stupid to say here, in the West, that they do not understand; but frankly if I feel anguished sometimes in prison, there are volcans that come. . . . I do my ablutions. I say two *rakats*,⁶⁹ and I get a feeling like I drank a bottle of whisky."⁷⁰

For these detainees, be they lifelong Muslims or converts, the institutional framework that governs religious practices in prison varies from one country to another. In the French and Belgian contexts, which feature considerable Muslim prison populations, contentious situations can arise. This is fueled in part by the fact that in France there are significantly fewer chaplains available for Islam compared to Christianity or Judaism. Thus, when ethicized religion transcends the social—for example, when prisoners pray in public spaces—conflict breaks out. At the same time, this can be understood as a challenge to prison order and as an act to show that the divine law of Islam is superior to institutional regulations.

Another determining factor is forgiveness. Of course, all three monotheistic religions concern themselves with forgiveness; however, the sacrament of forgiveness does not exist in Islam. Only God has the power of forgiveness, without any human intermediary. The relatively recent arrival of Islam in Europe (although history claims otherwise)⁷¹ has meant that the presence of chaplains has not been institutionalized for some time. France and its *laïcité* principal, unique in Europe, is the typical example. The presence of Muslim chaplains, few in number, is almost limited to the celebration of Friday prayer. There is also neither a clergy nor sacrament in Islam. Forgiveness therefore is not conveyed by an institution or by sacred personnel. The inmates' relationship to imams determines much, but these imams maintain close and lasting relationships with detainees without having an idea of the religious knowledge conveyed or their personal influence on convicts.

⁶⁸ My translation. Rachel Sarg and Anne-Sophie Lamine, "La religion en prison," *Archives de sciences sociales des religions* 153 (2011): 90.

⁶⁹ Bowing down. Twice in the text.

⁷⁰ My translation; *ibid.*, 91.

⁷¹ Raja Sakrani, "The Law of the Other" (note 7).

Islam is also characterized by its highly integrative capacity within the group. The group, or community, therefore, takes the lead over the individual. Group membership thus explains intriguing phenomena such as positioning in counter-power. Groups are more common in prisons where sentences are quite long. As found in a survey conducted in France, a group of Muslims encouraged new converts to refuse to see or shake hands with women (supervisors, inclusion advisors, social workers, etc.), or to claim a place for daily prayer by praying in groups in libraries or courtyards. Several prison staff say that having the protection of the group motivates most Muslim converts.⁷² "Islam is a powerful attractor given its current position in the world and its status as a subculture. It gives dignity to those who feel oppressed."⁷³ While some researchers⁷⁴ have been interested in the role of Islam in the identity construction of troubled young people, others have focused on the polarization of the representation of the world. "[R]ejected by the wealthy, the religion of Allah fascinates those who are in conflict with social order. By marrying Islam, one opposes the society of the 'powerful' and the 'integrated' perceived as hostile."⁷⁵

Islam thus becomes an attractive religion in detention because it mobilizes the values of the strong in the sense of virility: strong and virile men who are able to frighten society and the existing system. This gives it a high rank in the hierarchy of prison values. Unlike outside, the Muslim and the converted prisoner belong to the category of strong and virile men⁷⁶ in the social order of prisons. We should not only speak about wishful socialization processes and spaces: the prison is a "total institution," so much more interpretation of this *panopticon* (Foucault) may be desired. But so much more, as well, must we be aware of this ambiguous site of socialization.

Conclusion

This chapter intended to raise questions and give answers about the logic of socialization processes in the "Muslim personality" in an ideal typical way. How to transmit norms and values in a society that sometimes "refuses you by ignoring you, thus pushing you to the limits of the clandestine"⁷⁷? How to transmit Islamic

⁷² "La religion en prison" (note 68), 99.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁷⁴ Tietz and others.

⁷⁵ Farhad Khosrokhavar, *L'islam dans les prisons* (Paris: Ballande, 2004), 38–39.

⁷⁶ We do not yet have systematic research on women and their conversion in European prisons.

⁷⁷ Abdalmalek Sayad, *La double absence. Des illusions de l'émigré aux souffrances de l'im-migré*, preface by Pierre Bourdieu (Paris: Seuil, 1999).

religion if you are normatively constructed to the term of an "Islamic exception"?⁷⁸ How could young Muslims of Syrian, Turkish, Pakistani, North African, or Senegalese origin be able to rework and recompose the categories of belonging in the same way as their European Catholic or Protestant or Jewish peers, by mocking their cultural and religious specificities?

This essay has tried to demonstrate that the dynamics of Islamic religious socialization in Europe is negotiated across at least four central axes: transition in the religious transmission process through symbolism and rituals or practices; the problem of a new religious authority quest and creation of new theological and legal Islamic universities and institutes; the growing claim of gender identity for women through religion; and, finally, a new citizenship requirement. To the question how to be a good Muslim in European pluralistic societies today, the answer is certainly still to come, when the process of religious socialization reflects sociolegal contours more clearly. Furthermore, one has to be aware of the "integration paradox" (*das Integrationsparadox*), which reflects the complexity of Muslims' everyday life.⁷⁹ One thing is certain, at least among a large segment of the young Muslim generations in Europe: to be a good Muslim is to be a good citizen, free and autonomous. More uncertain is the identity of those who left that religion or remain part of an Islamic community mainly as a common, shared culture.

⁷⁸ This also the title of Hamadi Redissi's book, *L'exception islamique* (Paris: Cérès, 2004).

⁷⁹ See especially the work of Aladin El-Mafaalani, *Das Integrationsparadox: Warum gelungene Integration zu mehr Konflikten führt* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2018); (with Ahmet Toprak), *Muslimische Kinder und Jugendliche in Deutschland. Lebenswelten—Denkmuster—Herausforderungen* (Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2017).

Chinese Family Education and Spiritual Intervention

Voluntary and Involuntary Moral Actions from Neurological and Theological Perspectives

Milton Wai-Yiu Wan and Renee Lai-Fan Ip

Introduction

Rapid advancements in technology have brought an unthinkable acceleration of changes in our global community, our means of communication, the raising of children, and human development generally. Core values that have long been accepted as absolute are being disputed, questioned, and altered. This disruption has created significant challenges to moral education, which focuses on cultivation of moral character and is rooted in an assumption of consensual sets of values and behavioral standards. Internalization of moral virtues and moral rules as the goal in moral education has been thoroughly criticized and refuted by contemporary philosophers for its ridding of one's ability to make adaptive decisions to respond to abrupt problematic social situations.¹ Different approaches and aims to moral education have been proposed. These attempts have deepened our understanding of morality and human nature.

In this chapter, to address some of the challenges in moral education, we intend to reexamine the considerations for moral education based on understandings from recent neurological findings, centuries-old family education in the Chinese culture, and Christian spirituality. Let us begin our journey with an analysis of moral action and its motivating dynamics.

¹ See, e.g., M.H. Mitias, "Moral Development and Moral Education," in *Sustainable Human Development in the Twenty-First Century*, vol. 1, ed. I. Sirageldin (Oxford: EOLSS Publishers, 2009), 89–103.